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Selling connected devices in the US: the security rules
By Manish SharmaPublished 3 min read
Founder and CEO, MAGDOX. Writes on firmware security and device regulation.
The US has no single federal security law for consumer connected devices. California and Oregon require reasonable security features, met for remote access by a password unique to each device or one the user sets before first use. Section 889 of the 2019 defense authorization act keeps certain Chinese telecom and video surveillance equipment out of federal purchases, and the FCC's Cyber Trust Mark is a voluntary label built on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.
In short
- The US has no single federal security law for consumer connected devices. California and Oregon set the baseline: reasonable security, and for remote access a unique password or one the user sets first.
- Selling to the federal government brings section 889 of the 2019 defense authorization act, which keeps certain Chinese telecom and video surveillance equipment out.
- The FCC's Cyber Trust Mark is voluntary, and it builds on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.
US device security rules are a patchwork. For a camera or router maker, four pieces matter: two state laws, one procurement rule and one voluntary label.
What do the California and Oregon laws require?
California Civil Code section 1798.91.04, from SB-327 and in force since 1 January 2020, and the Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813 ask the same thing in almost the same words. A manufacturer must equip a connected device with reasonable security features, suited to what the device is and the information it collects, stores or transmits, that protect it from unauthorised access, use, change or disclosure.
For a device that can be accessed from outside the local network, the law says that standard is met when either:
- each device ships with a preprogrammed password unique to that device, or
- the device makes the user set a new means of authentication before it can be used for the first time.
Oregon's law covers connected devices used mainly for personal, family or household purposes and sold in Oregon. A breach of it is an unlawful trade practice. Both laws matter well beyond their states, because few makers ship a separate firmware for them.
What does NDAA section 889 mean for device makers?
Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 is a procurement rule, implemented in FAR 52.204-25. It has two parts:
| Prohibition | From | What it bars |
|---|---|---|
| Buying | 13 August 2019 | Federal agencies buying equipment, systems or services that use covered telecommunications equipment as a substantial or essential component |
| Using | 13 August 2020 | Federal agencies contracting with an entity that uses such equipment, even outside the contract |
Covered equipment is that of Huawei and ZTE for any purpose, and the video surveillance and telecommunications equipment of Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua for public safety, government facility security, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure and other national security purposes, including their subsidiaries and affiliates. The FCC also keeps a Covered List of equipment and services it considers a national security risk.
For a maker, the practical question is whether any covered vendor's software or components sit inside the product, often through a chip vendor's SDK. That is a question of evidence, and the answer goes to your own counsel and your government buyer.
Is the FCC Cyber Trust Mark required?
No. The U.S. Cyber Trust Mark is a voluntary label for consumer wireless IoT products, adopted by the FCC in 2024. Its criteria build on NIST IR 8425, NIST's profile of the IoT core baseline for consumer products. If you sell through US retailers, it is a signal buyers may start to look for.
NIST's baselines are also a good checklist on their own, whether or not you apply for the label. Our post on IEC 62443-4-2 and NIST IR 8425 walks through them.
What can the firmware show?
- The password rule. No universal default password, no hard-coded credentials, no account without a password, and a first-use flow that forces a new password. The password checklist lists what to look for, across the US, UK and EU rules.
- Covered vendor components. Software from covered vendors, found in the image with the files that show it, as evidence for a procurement review.
- The NIST baseline. Software update, data protection and secure configuration checks, release by release.
FDIE by Magdox shows the California and Oregon laws, NIST IR 8425 and NIST IR 8259A, and NDAA 889 component evidence for products sold in the US. For NDAA 889 it never gives an automatic verdict, only the evidence and the files behind it. Our maps of device security frameworks by market and the UK PSTI rules cover the other markets.
Questions
Is there a federal IoT security law for consumer devices in the US?
Not a general one. The main state laws are California's (Civil Code section 1798.91.04, from SB-327) and the Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813; federal rules mostly reach products sold to the government.
What do the California and Oregon laws require?
Reasonable security features suited to the device and its data. For a device that can be accessed from outside the local network, that is met by a preprogrammed password unique to each device, or by making the user set a new means of authentication before first access.
What does NDAA section 889 prohibit?
Federal agencies may not buy equipment that uses covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment as a substantial or essential component, from 13 August 2019, nor contract with an entity that uses it, from 13 August 2020.
Is the FCC Cyber Trust Mark mandatory?
No. It is a voluntary label for consumer wireless IoT products, adopted by the FCC in 2024, built on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.
Sources
- California Civil Code section 1798.91.04 (California Legislative Information) leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
- Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813 oregon.public.law
- FAR 52.204-25, implementing section 889 of the FY2019 NDAA (Acquisition.gov) acquisition.gov
- FCC, U.S. Cyber Trust Mark fcc.gov
- FCC, List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act fcc.gov
- NIST IR 8425, Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products csrc.nist.gov
Product and project names are trademarks of their owners, used only to identify the public firmware, software and standards discussed. MAGDOX is not affiliated with or endorsed by them.