For leaders

Selling connected devices in the US: the security rules

By Manish SharmaPublished 3 min read

Founder and CEO, MAGDOX. Writes on firmware security and device regulation.

The US has no single federal security law for consumer connected devices. California and Oregon require reasonable security features, met for remote access by a password unique to each device or one the user sets before first use. Section 889 of the 2019 defense authorization act keeps certain Chinese telecom and video surveillance equipment out of federal purchases, and the FCC's Cyber Trust Mark is a voluntary label built on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.

In short

  • The US has no single federal security law for consumer connected devices. California and Oregon set the baseline: reasonable security, and for remote access a unique password or one the user sets first.
  • Selling to the federal government brings section 889 of the 2019 defense authorization act, which keeps certain Chinese telecom and video surveillance equipment out.
  • The FCC's Cyber Trust Mark is voluntary, and it builds on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.

US device security rules are a patchwork. For a camera or router maker, four pieces matter: two state laws, one procurement rule and one voluntary label.

What do the California and Oregon laws require?

California Civil Code section 1798.91.04, from SB-327 and in force since 1 January 2020, and the Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813 ask the same thing in almost the same words. A manufacturer must equip a connected device with reasonable security features, suited to what the device is and the information it collects, stores or transmits, that protect it from unauthorised access, use, change or disclosure.

For a device that can be accessed from outside the local network, the law says that standard is met when either:

  • each device ships with a preprogrammed password unique to that device, or
  • the device makes the user set a new means of authentication before it can be used for the first time.

Oregon's law covers connected devices used mainly for personal, family or household purposes and sold in Oregon. A breach of it is an unlawful trade practice. Both laws matter well beyond their states, because few makers ship a separate firmware for them.

What does NDAA section 889 mean for device makers?

Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 is a procurement rule, implemented in FAR 52.204-25. It has two parts:

What does NDAA section 889 mean for device makers?
ProhibitionFromWhat it bars
Buying13 August 2019Federal agencies buying equipment, systems or services that use covered telecommunications equipment as a substantial or essential component
Using13 August 2020Federal agencies contracting with an entity that uses such equipment, even outside the contract

Covered equipment is that of Huawei and ZTE for any purpose, and the video surveillance and telecommunications equipment of Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua for public safety, government facility security, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure and other national security purposes, including their subsidiaries and affiliates. The FCC also keeps a Covered List of equipment and services it considers a national security risk.

For a maker, the practical question is whether any covered vendor's software or components sit inside the product, often through a chip vendor's SDK. That is a question of evidence, and the answer goes to your own counsel and your government buyer.

Is the FCC Cyber Trust Mark required?

No. The U.S. Cyber Trust Mark is a voluntary label for consumer wireless IoT products, adopted by the FCC in 2024. Its criteria build on NIST IR 8425, NIST's profile of the IoT core baseline for consumer products. If you sell through US retailers, it is a signal buyers may start to look for.

NIST's baselines are also a good checklist on their own, whether or not you apply for the label. Our post on IEC 62443-4-2 and NIST IR 8425 walks through them.

What can the firmware show?

  • The password rule. No universal default password, no hard-coded credentials, no account without a password, and a first-use flow that forces a new password. The password checklist lists what to look for, across the US, UK and EU rules.
  • Covered vendor components. Software from covered vendors, found in the image with the files that show it, as evidence for a procurement review.
  • The NIST baseline. Software update, data protection and secure configuration checks, release by release.

FDIE by Magdox shows the California and Oregon laws, NIST IR 8425 and NIST IR 8259A, and NDAA 889 component evidence for products sold in the US. For NDAA 889 it never gives an automatic verdict, only the evidence and the files behind it. Our maps of device security frameworks by market and the UK PSTI rules cover the other markets.

Questions

Is there a federal IoT security law for consumer devices in the US?

Not a general one. The main state laws are California's (Civil Code section 1798.91.04, from SB-327) and the Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813; federal rules mostly reach products sold to the government.

What do the California and Oregon laws require?

Reasonable security features suited to the device and its data. For a device that can be accessed from outside the local network, that is met by a preprogrammed password unique to each device, or by making the user set a new means of authentication before first access.

What does NDAA section 889 prohibit?

Federal agencies may not buy equipment that uses covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment as a substantial or essential component, from 13 August 2019, nor contract with an entity that uses it, from 13 August 2020.

Is the FCC Cyber Trust Mark mandatory?

No. It is a voluntary label for consumer wireless IoT products, adopted by the FCC in 2024, built on NIST's consumer IoT criteria.

Sources

  1. California Civil Code section 1798.91.04 (California Legislative Information) leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
  2. Oregon Revised Statutes 646A.813 oregon.public.law
  3. FAR 52.204-25, implementing section 889 of the FY2019 NDAA (Acquisition.gov) acquisition.gov
  4. FCC, U.S. Cyber Trust Mark fcc.gov
  5. FCC, List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act fcc.gov
  6. NIST IR 8425, Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products csrc.nist.gov

Product and project names are trademarks of their owners, used only to identify the public firmware, software and standards discussed. MAGDOX is not affiliated with or endorsed by them.

  • For leaders

    UK PSTI for connected device makers: the three rules

    Since 29 April 2024, consumer connectable products sold in the UK must meet three security requirements under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) regime: no universal default passwords, published information on how to report security issues, and a published minimum security update period. Each product must come with a statement of compliance. Firmware can show whether the password rule holds; the other two are documents you publish.

    · 3 min read

  • For engineers

    One firmware analysis for India, the EU and the US

    India, the EU and the US ask device makers the same technical questions in different words: no default passwords, signed updates, encrypted traffic, only the services the device needs, and no known exploitable vulnerabilities. One firmware analysis can answer those questions once and map each answer to the provision that asks it, from MeitY ER: 01 and NCCS ITSAR to the EU Cyber Resilience Act for products sold in the EU, EN 18031-1, NIST IR 8425 and the California and Oregon laws. Lab tests, procedures and policy documents still come from you.

    · 6 min read

  • For engineers

    Selling to industry or the US? What firmware can evidence

    Industrial and US buyers ask for different security baselines, and much of the proof sits in the firmware. IEC 62443-4-2 sets technical requirements for industrial automation components at capability security levels 1 to 4. NIST IR 8259A and NIST IR 8425 are voluntary US baselines for IoT devices and consumer IoT products. The FCC adopted NIST IR 8425 as the basis of its Cyber Trust Mark. Firmware evidence helps with some requirements in each, on credentials, services, integrity, cryptography and logging, but decides none of them alone. Identity, configuration, documentation and support need your team.

    · 9 min read

See what is inside your next release

Book a 30 or 45 minute demo with the team that builds FDIE, or request access for your organisation.

Request access