Dynamic analysis
Add bounded execution evidence to the static assessment. FDIE can emulate supported Linux binaries (MIPS, ARM, AArch64 and x86-64) and fuzz them, then retain the observations, failures and coverage that explain the run.
01 / Input
Binary, dependencies and an appropriate execution method.
02 / Bounded sandbox
Attempt supported emulation or boot with resource and network restrictions.
Use supported inputs or fuzzing targets and retain the run outcome.
03 / Evidence
Events, candidate failures, reproduction material and explicit coverage.
Conceptual execution workflow. Device compatibility and the paths actually exercised determine the evidence available.
Observe
Processes, loaded libraries and listening sockets
Investigate
Candidate crashes and available reproducing inputs
Qualify
Executed, failed, timed-out and unsupported work
Choose the method for the image
A supported CPU architecture is one prerequisite. The recovered filesystem, ABI, libraries, kernel and hardware interfaces also affect whether execution can proceed. FDIE keeps the chosen method and its result with the assessment.
Attempt selected supported binaries in a bounded environment and inspect available process, library and behaviour observations. This can yield useful evidence without reconstructing an entire device.
Missing dependencies, unsupported instructions and hardware access can stop a target before the relevant path executes.
Where the deployment provides a compatible kernel, attempt startup of supported Linux firmware and inspect the activity reached. This adds system-level context to an individual executable's evidence.
Custom kernels, drivers and peripheral assumptions can prevent boot. A successful startup still leaves many application paths untested.
Supply generated inputs to supported targets and retain candidate failures for investigation. A useful record identifies the target, input and available execution trace.
A crash needs reproduction and root-cause review before its security impact is known.
Recover supported build, container and static binary metadata even when there is no Linux filesystem or compatible boot path.
This is static evidence. It is not presented as a successful emulation of the physical device.
Interpret the recorded behaviour
Runtime output is most useful when the reviewer can distinguish a directly observed event from a broader inference. Connect the observation to the target, execution mode and run context, then investigate whether it matters on the product as deployed.
| Observed event | Useful evidence | Additional investigation |
|---|---|---|
| A process executed | The binary ran within the tested environment | Which inputs and relevant paths were exercised? |
| A library loaded | The component participated in the run | Was the affected function reachable and invoked? |
| A service listened | A socket was opened in the sandbox | How is the service exposed and authenticated on the device? |
| An interpreter launched | The target started a shell or another interpreter | Was the command influenced by an untrusted input? |
| A target crashed | The recorded input or environment caused a failure | Can it be reproduced, explained and assigned a security impact? |
| Nothing was observed | No event was seen in this bounded attempt | Did the target execute far enough to assess the relevant behaviour? |
From a crash to a confirmed issue
Fuzzing can produce a lead that static analysis does not reveal. Keep the target and available reproduction material together so an engineer can determine whether the failure comes from the firmware, a missing dependency or the execution environment.
When the issue is understood, test the proposed remediation against the reproducer and the product’s normal behaviour. A disappearing crash is useful evidence, but the change still needs an engineering review.
Repeat the failure with the same target and controlled input. Record where reproduction differs from the original sandbox run.
Inspect the trace and affected operation. Distinguish environment failures from a fault with a meaningful security impact.
Review the fix, rerun the reproducer and run the relevant regression tests. Retain the outcome with the release evidence.
An operating requirement
Untrusted firmware needs a controlled execution environment. Resource limits, restricted permissions, scratch-space controls and blocked sandbox network egress form the execution boundary. The deployment operator must validate and maintain that boundary.
For an on-premises installation, include host and emulator patching, storage limits, approved endpoint-protection exceptions and recovery procedures in the handover. Scope exceptions to the analysis paths that need them.
Runtime review guideNo. Static recognition, binary analysis and runtime execution have separate support requirements. Qualify the exact image and execution mode during evaluation.
Not automatically. A component or process observation needs vulnerability-specific and device-specific context.
Keep the failed or unassessed state in the record, use the available static evidence and plan any necessary manual or physical-device testing.
FDIE · next step
Choose authorised firmware with known behaviour. Review which targets execute, what the observations establish and which questions still need device-level testing.
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